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ARTICLE
AN ADVISORY CENTRE ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: KEY FEATURES
KARL P. SAUVANT*
ABSTRACT: The United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) has put the idea of an Advisory Centre on International
Investment Law (ACIIL) on its agenda. The Centre is meant to help under-
resourced developing countries in international investment disputes. This
paper begins with a brief review of the rise of such disputes and their costs
and outlines the principal characteristics of the Advisory Centre on World
Trade Organization (WTO) law as a precedent for an ACIIL. It then focuses
on the possible key features of an ACIIL, namely the potential benefi-
ciaries, the possible range of services it could provide, its governance, and
its financing. The paper ends with a proposal for the way forward.
INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ADEQUATE DISPUTE-
SETTLEMENT PROCESS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME
The international investment law and policy regime is one of the
strongest international regimes in existence. It derives its strength from the
facts that international investors can directly bring claims against allegedly
offending States if they consider that their rights have been violated and
that this investor-State dispute-settlement (ISDS) regime—arbitration by ad
hoc tribunals—settles disputes in a manner that can be (and typically are)
enforced. This dispute-settlement mechanism is at the heart of the interna-
tional investment regime and therefore of great relevance for both States
and investors.
Yet, this dispute-settlement mechanism has come under considerable
criticism, as recognized in UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on “Investor-
* Karl P. Sauvant (karlsauvant@gmail.com) is Resident Senior Fellow at the Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, a joint Center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute
at Columbia University. I am grateful to Nicolas Angelet, Meg Kinnear, Niall Meagher, Luke
Nottage, Federico Ortino, Jan Yves Remy, Gätan Verhoosel, Damon Vis-Dunbar, Kanawan
Waitayagitgumjon, and Lou Wells for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and
Evan Gabor and Yardenne Kagan for excellent research assistance.
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State Dispute Settlement Reform.”1 Many of these criticisms are reflected
in the Working Group’s reports2 (and hence do not need to be repeated
here). They are at the basis of the Working Group’s efforts to improve the
regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism.
Improvement is all the more important as the number of investor-State
disputes is rising,3 and there is considerable potential for more disputes. By
the end of 2018, 942 known treaty-based ISDS cases had been reported,
involving 117 countries as respondents.4 Some two-thirds of the cases had
developing countries or economies in transition as respondents,5 and the
great majority arose only since the year 2000. Moreover, ISDS proceedings
can also be initiated on the basis of state contracts, as well as investment
laws adopted by national legislatures, under dispute-settlement provisions
contained in them. Contract-based ISDS cases numbered 127 in ICSID
alone by the end of 2018,6 and those based on investment laws of host
countries numbered 687—virtually all of them involving developing coun-
1. See Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, U.N. COMM’N ON
INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state (last visited Apr. 23,
2021).
2. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930/Rev.1 (Dec.
19, 2017); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/935 (May 14,
2018); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964 (Nov. 6, 2018);
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/970 (Apr. 9, 2019).
3. For a recent comprehensive discussion of the rise of treaty-based investment disputes and
their salient features, see Roberto Echandi, The Debate on Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Empirical Evidence (1987-2017) and Policy Implications, ICSID REVIEW 1–30
(2019); see generally Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Laura Letourneau-Tremblay, Empirical
Perspectives on Investment Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does It Matter?, ISDS ACAD. F.
WORKING GRP. 7 (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.cids.ch/images/Documents/Academic-Forum/7_
Empirical_perspectives_-_WG7.pdf.
4. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Fact Sheet: Number of New
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases in 2018, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/INF/2019/4
(2019), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d4_en.pdf.
5. See Investment Dispute Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
investment-dispute-settlement (last updated July 31, 2020). For the classification of countries, see
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic
Zones, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2019, annex 1 (2019), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-
document/wir2019_en.pdf [hereinafter World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones].
6. See Spotlight on Contract-Based Disputes at ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPS. https://icsid-archive.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Spotlight-on-Contract-based-Dis
putes-at-ICSID.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2021). As of December 31, 2018, ICSID had registered
706 cases under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules. Contract-based cases
amounted to 16% of the total. See The ICSID Caseload—Statistics, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT
OF INV. DISPS. 7 (2019), https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/Caseload%20
Statistics/en/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1%20%28English%29_rev.pdf.
7. The ICSID Caseload — Statistics, supra note 6, at 10. In a few of these cases, the instru-
ment of consent was also a treaty.
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tries or economies in transition. This brought the overall total of ISDS cases
easily to well over 1,100 by the end of 2018.8
In addition, the average number of disputes has been growing over the
years. Newly initiated treaty-based investment arbitrations averaged eight
per year during 1996–1998, rose more than fourfold to thirty-six per year
during 2006–2008 and doubled further to seventy-six per year during
2016–2018.9 During the same time periods, the annual number of new con-
tract-based cases at ICSID alone averaged three, six, and six, respectively.10
It is quite likely that the number of disputes will grow further, as inter-
national investors discover and have recourse to the ISDS mechanism, facil-
itated perhaps (among other things), by third-party funders.11 In fact, the
potential for disputes is considerable, considering (1) the growth of inward
FDI (with its stock amounting, at the end of 2018, to US$32 trillion);12 (2)
the number of international investors controlling assets abroad (which is
substantially over 100,000), the number of their foreign affiliates (which is
substantially over one million) and the number of investors13 in such affili-
ates (all of which, depending on the applicable international investment
agreement (IIA), may have a right to initiate arbitration proceedings); (3)
the number of State contracts and national investment laws granting inter-
national dispute-settlement recourse; and (4) the embeddedness of FDI in
host countries, involving, as it does, a wide range of interactions relating to
the production process over the entire life-cycle of a project and, more
broadly, the relationship between foreign affiliates and host country govern-
ments. Add to that (5) the number of IIAs; (6) their proclivity toward broad
definitions of “investors” and “investments;” (7) their open-ended formula-
tion of investor protections, especially in old treaties; (8) the often impre-
cise drafting of (especially older) treaties, inflexible State contracts, as well
as national laws that may be in conflict with international obligations; and
(9) the fact that violations of investor rights can take place by different
8. These are publicly known disputes only.
9. See Investment Dispute Navigator, supra note 5.
10. See Spotlight on Contract-Based Disputes, supra note 6. In a few of these cases, the
instrument of consent was also a treaty.
11. See Brooke Güven & Lise Johnson, The Policy Implications of Third-Party Funding in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement 1–2 (Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. Working Paper, 2019),
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/publications/The-Policy-Implications-of-
Third-Party-Funding-in-Investor-State-Disptue-Settlement-FINAL.pdf. It is not clear to what ex-
tent (if at all) respondents have had access to third-party funders.
12. See World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones, supra note 5, at 216.
13. It has been observed that, “[a]s a consequence of ISDS tribunals’ permissive approach to
SRL [shareholder reflective loss] (the “pro-SRL interpretation”), investment treaties expose the
States parties to multiple (potentially limitless) claims in relation to a single dispute. The firm, as
well as its individual shareholders, may all bring suit over the same alleged treaty breach. And
most treaties require neither that such claims be joined nor that they be brought simultaneously.”
See Julian Arato, Kathleen Claussen, Jaemin Lee & Giovanni Zarra, Reforming Shareholder
Claims in ISDS 7 (UNCITRAL Acad. Forum on ISDS Working Paper 2019/9, 2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433465.
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branches of governments and specialized agencies, and at any administra-
tive level (i.e., not only the national level), including out of ignorance of
existing obligations, increasing in this manner the possibilities of actions
that can give rise to disagreements. Finally, (10) changing natural resource
prices can become a source of conflict in the absence of contract clauses
that allow for adjustments in light of changed circumstances, in particular
(11) when new governments come to power.
The potential for conflicts of all kinds between host States and interna-
tional investors is therefore considerable, as are the potential liabilities.
And, whatever the cause, it is virtually unavoidable that, as in every rela-
tionship, disputes arise from time to time between host States and interna-
tional investors. A dispute-settlement regime is needed to settle them,
especially if investors do not trust local courts, and governments of host
States do not want to use—or cannot use—the courts of investors’ home
countries.
Moreover, international investment disputes are costly.14 According to
one study, average party costs per case between 2013 and end-May 2017
were US$7.4 million for claimants and US$5.2 million for respondents,
with an upward trend; average tribunal costs were US$1.1 million per
case.15 During the same time period, the average amount of damages
claimed16 amounted to US$1.1 billion per case (excluding larger cases, it
came to US$196 million), also on an upward trend; however, the average
amount awarded17 to successful claimants was considerably less, US$171
million per case, again on an upward trend.18 As these numbers imply,
though there are many cases in which the costs are much lower, there re-
main many in which the costs are much higher, reaching into the billions of
dollars and accounting for substantial shares of foreign exchange. While
different authors report different cost figures (and use different methodolo-
14. For a discussion, see, for example, Catherine Titi, Julien Chaisse, Marko Jovanovic,
Facundo Pérez Aznar & Gabriel Bottini, Excessive Costs & Insufficient Recoverability of Cost
Awards, ACAD. FORUM ON ISDS (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.cids.ch/images/Documents/Aca
demic-Forum/1_Costs_-_WG1.pdf; see also Langford et al., supra note 3, at 7–10; SUSAN D.
FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
(2019). Moreover, there are other costs: as Nicolas Angelet pointed out, the financing of invest-
ment arbitration disproportionately affects the financing of public welfare in developing countries,
such as health and education. See Nicolas Angelet, Financing Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Is There A Role for the African Development Bank?, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE
RULE OF LAW: CONTRIBUTION AND CONFORMITY 546–55 (ICCA Congress Series No. 19, 2016).
15. Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration Revisited,” ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/
news-and-insights/news/damages-and-costs-in-investment-treaty-arbitration-revisited. The mean
averages are distorted by the largest claims.
16. This excludes the damages claimed in Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. The Russian
Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005).
17. Again, excluding Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation.
18. Id.
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gies, e.g., report median costs),19 the main features are clear: costs are high
and rising. To these financial costs, one has to add the potential reputational
costs suffered by host countries and the potential loss of FDI inflows.20
Given the centrality and potency of the regime’s dispute-settlement
mechanism, it needs to be beyond reproach. This is one of the reasons why
States are reviewing their substantive obligations in IIAs, why many States
are drafting revised model treaties, and why UNCITRAL’s Working Group
III is discussing how the dispute-settlement mechanism can be improved. In
doing so, the Working Group focuses on procedural improvements, as re-
flected in its reports.21
One important aspect, however, is only beginning to get attention in
the Working Group’s discussions, and it is central to the legitimacy of the
regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism: the fact that many developing
countries have neither the experienced personnel nor the financial resources
to defend themselves adequately in international arbitral proceedings and
prepare themselves properly in the crucial phase immediately ahead of such
proceedings. This limits, de facto, their ability to have access to justice on
the basis of equality of arms.22 It is a regime flaw that requires attention not
only because of its bearing on the credibility—and hence legitimacy—of
the investment regime, but also because of the often costly dispute-settle-
ment process, its outcome in terms of awards, and its potentially negative
reputational implications for the respondents as investment locations.
It is therefore laudable that UNCITRAL’s Working Group III—in re-
sponse to the suggestion of several member States23—has put the issues of
19. See Langford et al., supra note 3; Echandi, supra note 3; Titi et al., supra note 14; Luke
Nottage & Ana Ubilava, Costs, Outcomes and Transparency in ISDS Arbitrations: Evidence for
an Investment Treaty Parliamentary Inquiry (Sydney L. Sch. Research Paper No. 18/46, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227401.
20. Thus, it has been claimed that the filing of claims leads to substantial losses in FDI
inflows. See Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment
Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, International Organization, 65 INT’L ORG. 401,
414 (2011). Research by Shahryar Minhas and Karen L. Remmer suggests that while disputes
registered at ICSID between 1984 and 2006 did not have an impact on the reputation of host State
respondents in international investment disputes and investment flows to them, those registered
after 2006 did. See generally Shahryar Minhas & Karen L. Remmer, The Reputational Impact of
Investor-State Disputes, 44 INT’L INTERACTIONS 862 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/
10.1080/03050629.2018.1492384.
21. Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, supra note 1.
22. The same issue can be raised for resource constrained international investors, especially
small and medium-sized enterprises and natural persons. This issue is not being discussed here.
23. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission from the Government of Thailand, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.162 (Mar. 8, 2019); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission
from the European Union and its Member States, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1
(Jan. 24, 2019);  U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission from the Government of Morocco,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.161 (Mar. 4, 2019); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submis-
sion from the Government of Costa Rica, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.164 (Mar. 22,
2019); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission from the Government of Columbia, U.N. Doc.
No. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.173 (June 14, 2019); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission from
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de facto access to justice and creating a level playing field in regard to
international investment dispute settlement on its agenda, under the title
“Advisory Centre on International Investment Law.”24 The following dis-
cussion addresses a number of issues related to the establishment of such a
Centre, beginning with a brief description of a similar institution in the
trade area.
I. THE PRECEDENT: THE ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAW
Efforts to establish an Advisory Centre on International Investment
Law (ACIIL)25 can learn from the successful approach pursued in another
field, namely the international trade area, when interested governments cre-
ated the independent Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) as an inter-
governmental organization.
The ACWL was established in 2001.26 As of July 2019, eighty coun-
tries were entitled to its services.27 Its establishment reflected the fact that,
after the creation of the WTO in 1995, the number and complexity of WTO
disputes rose considerably. Even today, “[w]hile most developed countries
have ‘in-house’ legal expertise that enable them to understand WTO law
and to participate fully in the WTO legal system, most developing countries
the Government of Turkey, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.174 (July 11, 2019); U.N.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission from the Government of the Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc.
No. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.179 (July 31, 2019).
24. See, in this context, the report prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat for this agenda
item: U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.III/
WP.168 (July 25, 2019), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/wp168.pdf. There may
be other ways in which this objective could be achieved. In particular, one could establish a
litigation fund on which countries could draw; one could set up a revolving fund into which
successful respondents could pay a part of the damages that they did not need to pay; and one
could seek to mobilize pro bono or reduced-fee services.
25. For a discussion of earlier efforts to establish an ACIIL, see Anna Joubin-Bret, Establish-
ing an International Advisory Centre on Investment Disputes?, E15 INITIATIVE (Dec. 2015) http://
e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Investment-Joubin-Bret-Final.pdf; Robert Sch-
wieder, Legal Aid and Investment Treaty Disputes: Lessons Learned From the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law and Investment Experiences, 19 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 628, 628–66 (2018). See also
Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for A Legal Assistance Center for Develop-
ing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 238, 238–75 (2007);
Luke Nottage & Kate Miles, ‘Back to the Future’ for Investor-State Arbitrations: Revising Rules
in Australia and Japan to Meet Public Interests, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 25 (2009); Karl P. Sauvant, The
Evolving International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Ways Forward, E15 Task Force on
Investment Policy, E15 INITIATIVE (Jan. 2016), https://e15initiative.org/publications/evolving-inter
national-investment-law-policy-regime-ways-forward; and FRANCK, supra note 14, at 301–02.
26. For a discussion of the ACWL, see Niall Meagher & Leah Buencamino, The Advisory
Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L PROC. L. (Apr. 2018), https://
opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeipro/e1195.013.1195/law-mpeipro-e1195?prd=OPIL; Ni-
all Meagher, Representing Developing Countries Before the WTO: The Role of the Advisory Cen-
tre on WTO Law (ACWL), EUR. UNIV. INST. (May 2015), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/
1814/35747/RSCAS_PP_2015_02.pdf.
27. See Members, ACWL, https://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction (last visited Apr. 20,
2021).
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and LDCs [least developed countries] do not.”28 Together with financial
and institutional constraints, this situation made it difficult for developing
countries to use the WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism effectively. The
ACWL was therefore created “to provide these countries with this legal
capacity and to help them to understand fully their rights and obligations
under WTO law.”29
Accordingly, the ACWL provides a range of important services to its
beneficiaries: all developing countries that have become members of the
Centre and have contributed to its Endowment Fund. In addition, LDCs are
automatically entitled to the Centre’s services, without having to become
ACWL members or having to contribute to its Endowment Fund, as long as
they are WTO members or are in the process of becoming members.30 (De-
veloped countries are not entitled to the Centre’s services.)
The services that the ACWL provides are (1) giving free advice, in the
form of legal opinions, to governments on all procedural and substantive
issues arising under WTO law; (2) assisting countries (for modest fees, but
free-of-charge for LDCs) in all stages of the WTO’s regular panel and Ap-
pellate Body proceedings as complainants, respondents and third parties,
beginning with the initial assessment and preparation of cases and including
advocacy at panel meetings (including answering questions from panels and
parties at the meetings), to drafting notices of appeal and advocacy during
Appellate Body hearings; (3) supporting alternative dispute-settlement pro-
ceedings; and (4) holding trainings on WTO law and procedures, as well as
arranging secondments for government lawyers at the Centre.31 In 2018
alone, the ACWL prepared 237 legal opinions, assisted developing coun-
tries in seventeen disputes (including five new ones), awarded training cer-
tificates to thirty-nine delegates, and undertook various ad hoc trainings.32
As to governance, the ACWL is independent from the WTO. Its Gen-
eral Assembly—consisting of representatives of the (in 2019) forty-seven
members of the ACWL (thirty-six developing countries; eleven developed
countries, plus one associate developed country member33) and the forty-
four LDCs entitled to the Centre’s services—oversees the Centre’s func-
tioning, monitors its finances and adopts the annual budget.34 The Manage-
28. The Services of the ACWL, ACWL 2, https://www.acwl.ch/download/ql/Services_of_
the_ACWL.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 8–26.
32. Report on Operations 2018, ACWL 1 (2018), https://www.acwl.ch/download/dd/reports_
ops/Final_Report_on_Operations_2018-for-website.pdf.
33. The associate member status was designed to facilitate the participation of interested
governments pending ratification of the ACWL agreement. Associate members have all the privi-
leges of a full member, except the right to vote (there have not been any votes so far). Currently,
Germany is the only associate member; it is in the process of becoming a full member.
34. See Members, supra note 27; The Services of the ACWL, supra note 28, at 4.
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ment Board—consisting of six persons from developed and developing
countries, serving in their personal capacity—decides on matters related to
the efficient and effective operation of the ACWL and oversees the man-
agement of the ACWL’s Endowment Fund; it reports to the General As-
sembly. Finally, an Executive Director and two Deputy Directors manage
the ACWL’s day-to-day operations; the Executive Director is also an ex
officio member of the Management Board.35
The ACWL is financed from the revenues of an Endowment Fund es-
tablished through contributions from developed and developing country
members; fees generated by supporting dispute-settlement proceedings; and
voluntary contributions from members.36 More specifically, the one-time
contributions of newly acceding developing countries are determined on the
basis of their share of world trade and per capita income, classified in three
membership categories: Category A: CHF486,000; Category B:
CHF162,000; and Category C: CHF81,000.37 There is no fixed membership
amount for developed countries; a financial contribution is agreed with the
ACWL’s General Assembly upon ratification of the ACWL Agreement.
Developed countries also contribute the bulk of voluntary contributions. As
already mentioned, LDCs that are members of the WTO (or are in the pro-
cess of acceding to the organization) are entitled to the Centre’s services
without having to become members of the ACWL. The ACWL’s proposed
regular budget for 2019 is CHF4,665,000.38
There is general agreement that the ACWL has done a good job39 and
in this manner has contributed to the legitimacy of the international trading
system. The reasons include that it has had excellent leadership and dedi-
cated staff; that its staff is respected and trusted by parties seeking the Cen-
tre’s assistance, helping staff to establish an open and deep relationship
with beneficiaries; and that it can act as an honest broker, including by
advising governments when to seek a compromise.
II. AN ADVISORY CENTRE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
Any effort to establish an Advisory Centre on International Investment
Law can learn from the arrangements and experience of the Advisory Cen-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5–6.
38. See Budget for 2019: Proposal of the Management Board, ACWL (Oct. 5, 2018), https://
www.acwl.ch/download/general_assembly_mmeting_documents/11.12.2018/ACWL-MB-W-
2018-6-Budget-for-2019.pdf.
39. See, e.g., James Ransdell, Financial and Technical Support for Litigants in Inter-State
Disputes: The Example of the WTO and the Advisory Centre for WTO Law, SSRN (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957476; Gregory C. Shaffer, Assessing the Advisory Centre on WTO
Law from a Broader Governance Perspective (Minn. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 11-46,
2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1966251; CHAD BOWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2010).
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tre on WTO Law.40 Thus, interested governments could establish an ACIIL
as an independent intergovernmental organization to deal with international
investment disputes, with its membership being open to all countries.
Naturally, making such a Centre operational requires addressing a
number of issues. Some of these are outlined next.41
A. Beneficiaries
To begin with—and using as the principal criterion that respondent
governments should be under-resourced—the beneficiaries could only be
developing countries and economies in transition that are members of the
ACIIL, with, on the one hand, taking into account level of income, and, on
the other hand, granting special conditions to LDCs.42 Many of these coun-
tries do not have the top-level in-house human capacity to deal effectively
with highly complex issues of international investment law, and many have
great difficulties allocating the financial resources required to hire interna-
tional law firms to help in their defense. (A number of developed countries,
too, do not have the in-house human capacity required to deal with the
entire range of issues related to investment disputes. Switzerland, for exam-
ple, seeks external support to defend itself in ISDS cases, but it has the
financial means to hire outside lawyers to deal with cases if and when they
arise.)
Moreover, if States face (or are likely to face) disputes only from time
to time, the opportunity costs of building up highly competent43 in-house
capacity (and the possibility that competent staff may be rotated within the
government or hired away by international law firms) may not be attractive.
At the same time, it would be desirable for government lawyers to be part
of any defense teams and to develop the capacity to prevent and resolve
disputes at the national level (see below).
40. For one conception of an ACIIL, see Jeremy Sharpe, An International Investment Advi-
sory Center: Beyond the WTO Model, EJIL: TALK! (July 26, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/an-
international-investment-advisory-center-beyond-the-wto-model.
41. For an exhaustive discussion of the issues, see Lise Johnson & Brooke Güven, A Scoping
Study on Securing Adequate Legal Defense in Proceedings Under International Investment Agree-
ments, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/
securing-adequate-legal-defense-proceedings-under-international-investment-agreements.
42. One could also consider the possibility of granting other members of the ACIIL (includ-
ing developed countries) the right to seek assistance in specific circumstances (e.g., to request
legal opinions when a number of developed and developing country governments face claims
arising out of the same measures/circumstances) as this may help clarify issues of relevance to the
investment regime as a whole.
43. And if the in-house capacity is not top-level, respondents may be at a disadvantage when
defending themselves. Moreover, if, because of inadequate representation, respondents lose cases,
unfortunate precedents (even if not binding) may be set for subsequent cases, with potential sys-
temic implications.
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B. Services
Ideally, an ACIIL would assist requesting governments in the entire
range of challenges related to the international investment law and policy
regime in general and sources of conflicts in particular. Most notably, such
assistance could be geared toward (1) seeking to avoid that conflicts arise in
the first place, including through help in the drafting of IIAs, State contracts
and national investment laws in a manner that helps to avoid conflicts be-
tween international investors and host States; (2) the management of con-
flicts between international investors and host country governments at the
national level so that, if and when conflicts arise (including at the sub-na-
tional level), these do not reach the international level but rather are re-
solved locally; and (3) the handling of disputes reaching the international
level so that they are managed properly when they reach that level.
There is no doubt that a number of countries would benefit from tech-
nical assistance in regard to this entire range of challenges. Ideally, there-
fore, an ACIIL could become a one-stop shop, so to speak, and provide
comprehensive assistance to under-resourced governments. However, at
least two considerations need to be kept in mind when discussing the possi-
ble scope of activities of an ACIIL, namely the desirability to avoid dupli-
cating the work of other organizations and, at the same time, keep funding
needs down. Therefore, and before turning to the services an ACIIL could
provide, a brief review of the assistance already available to developing
countries is in order.44
1. Conflict Avoidance
The imprecise drafting of IIAs, State contracts and national laws and
their insufficient implementation can be important reasons for conflicts be-
tween international investors and host States that eventually become ISDS
cases and result in high costs for respondents. Addressing this issue is there-
fore important. In fact, a number of organizations offer technical assistance
in this respect (ranging from the training of government officials to making
ad hoc advisory services available to requesting countries), often based on
research.
Regarding the drafting of IIAs and issues surrounding these agree-
ments, UNCTAD has a long-standing program to provide training on the
negotiation of such treaties, based on extensive and in-depth research and
the monitoring of trends; informed by intergovernmental deliberations in its
Investment Commission and its Reform Package for the International In-
vestment Regime;45 and, upon request, supplemented by country-specific
44. For a comprehensive review, see Johnson & Güven, supra note 41.
45. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD’s Reform Package for the
International Investment Regime, INV. POL’Y HUB (2018), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
uploaded-files/document/UNCTAD_Reform_Package_2018.pdf.
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advisory services.46 UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub, in particular, pro-
vides comprehensive information about the principal IIA matters, including
information on investment treaties, investment disputes, investment laws,
and policy measures.47 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), too, has an intergovernmental body dealing with in-
vestment issues whose deliberations are partly related to the organization’s
Policy Framework for Investment,48 and the legal research undertaken on
investment matters. The Investment Policy and Promotion Unit of the
World Bank Group also provides training in the international investment
area.49 Additionally, there are various non-governmental organizations that
organize training and advisory services and undertake related research, in-
cluding the International Institute for Sustainable Development50 and the
Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment.51
Regarding the drafting of State contracts, negotiations support is avail-
able through the International Senior Lawyers Program, which has a long-
standing program to provide pro bono legal services to requesting govern-
ments in relation to investment and commercial contracts involving foreign
investors.52 The African Legal Support Facility offers the same support to
African governments, free of charge.53 And the recently established CON-
NEX initiative provides, also free of charge, multidisciplinary teams to re-
questing governments of developing countries and transition economies
world-wide negotiating contracts with international investors, focused on
extractive industries and also infrastructure.54 Finally, the International De-
velopment Law Organization (IDLO) offers negotiation support related to
the LDCs, based on pro bono and reduced fee services.55
46. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Technical Cooperation Ac-
tivities of UNCTAD and Their Financing, U.N. Doc. TD/B/WP/290/Add. 1 (2018), https://unctad.
org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/wpd290add1_en.pdf.
47. See INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
48. See The Policy Framework for Investment, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/investment/
pfi.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2021).
49. See Investment Policy and Promotion, WORLD BANK (Feb. 28, 2019), https://
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/investment-climate/brief/investment-policy-and-promotion.
50. See, e.g., 12th Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators, INT’L INST.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.iisd.org/event/12th-annual-forum-developing-
country-investment-negotiators. Some trainings are provided together with the South Centre.
51. See Investment Law and Policy, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/content/investment-law-policy (last visited May 6, 2021).
52. For details, see Our Work, INT’L SENIOR LAWS. PROJECT, http://islp.org/our-work (last
visited Apr. 23, 2021).
53. For details, see What We Do, AFR. LEGAL SUPPORT FACILITY, https://www.aflsf.org/tags/
african-legal-support-facility (last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
54. For details, see CONNEX SUPPORT UNIT, https://www.connex-unit.org/en (last visited
Apr. 22, 2021).
55. For details, see Investment Support Services for Least Developed Countries, INT’L DEV.
L. ORG., https://www.idlo.int/Investment-Support-Programme-LDCs#Partners (last visited Apr.
12, 2021). The program is based on pro bono or reduced-fee services.
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Regarding national investment laws, the same organizations that pro-
vide support for the negotiation of IIAs also assist in the drafting of national
investment laws. In addition, various countries provide funding for this pur-
pose in the framework of their bilateral programs.
Finally, and as observed earlier, even when the appropriate instruments
are in place, it is also necessary to avoid ill-advised actions by State author-
ities, sometimes out of ignorance of provisions in IIAs. This challenge re-
quires primarily action at the national level. In particular, it requires that
central governments inform their ministries and various sub-national enti-
ties about the obligations they have entered into through international
treaties.
2. Conflict management at the national level
If and when conflicts between international investors and host States
occur—as they inevitably do, as discussed earlier—the challenge becomes
to manage those conflicts properly and to prevent them from reaching the
international level. For this purpose, a number of countries have established
mechanisms to monitor investor grievances before they escalate into out-
right conflicts, with a view toward resolving them. One such early-warning
mechanism consists of the creation of the institution of investment ombud-
spersons. The most well-known of these is probably the Office of the For-
eign Investment Ombudsman, a grievance resolution center established in
the Republic of Korea in 1999.56 Another approach is to create national
coordination committees to which conflicts are being reported, with a view
toward resolving them. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru are
examples for how this can be done.57
These mechanisms are very useful to address grievances and manage
conflicts, and they are becoming more valuable as the number of interna-
tional investment disputes rises and disputes become more complex and
costlier to resolve.58 For this reason, the World Bank is supporting countries
56. For details, see About Us, FOREIGN INV. OMBUDSMAN, https://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/
eng/au/poelb.do (last visited May 5, 2021). For a discussion, see Françoise Nicolas, Stephen
Thomsen & Mi-Hyun Bang, Lessons from Investment Policy Reform in Korea (OECD), (Working
Paper No. 2013/02, 2013), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/lessons-from-in
vestment-policy-reform-in-korea_5k4376zqcpf1-en;j.
57. For a discussion, see U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Investor-State Dispute Prevention Strat-
egies: Selected Case Studies, ASIA-PAC. ECON. COOP. (June 2013), https://www.apec.org/Groups/
Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/IEG/20130625_IEG-DisputePreven
tion.pdf. See also Best Practices Guidebook: Capacity Building to Ensure Appropriate and
Prompt Consideration of Investors’ Complaints to Improve the Investment Climate within APEC,
ASIA-PAC. ECON. COOP. (July 2015), https://www.apec.org/-/media/APEC/Publications/2015/7/
Best-Practices-Guidebook--CapacityBuilding-to-Ensure-Appropriate-and-Prompt-Consideration-
of-Investo/IEG_Best-Practices-Guidebk-2015.pdf.
58. The fact that many disputes are settled during arbitral proceedings suggests that these
disputes could potentially have been settled nationally before reaching the international level: of
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in the establishment of investment-grievance mechanisms to deal with in-
vestor grievances at an early stage and, if possible, resolve them.59
3. The Handling of Disputes Reaching the International Level
When disputes reach the international level, the challenge becomes
managing them in a manner that respondent States are in the best possible
position to prepare and defend themselves adequately.
This begins with undertaking proper preparations when respondents
are faced with formal notices of disputes by claimants, that is, before arbi-
tral proceedings begin. This is an important stage that may well be decisive
for the subsequent deliberations. In particular, governments that have not
yet (or seldom) been involved in international arbitral proceedings often
lack the experience of how to handle a notice of consultation or dispute. For
this reason, ICSID has issued detailed and practical step-by-step guidance
on how to respond to investment claims;60 it also provides capacity-build-
ing technical assistance on how cases are processed under ICSID rules.61
However, when it comes to formal international arbitral proceedings,
virtually no support is available to respondent governments. The Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) has a Financial Assistance Fund that is financed
by voluntary contributions; it helps developing countries that meet certain
conditions meet part of the costs of (the relatively few) investment arbitra-
tions administered by the PCA.62 The United Nations Secretary-General’s
Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) can assist States that do not have the neces-
sary financial resources in relation to expenses incurred in (the relatively
few) ICJ investment arbitration cases; it is funded by voluntary contribu-
tions and, hence, its support depends on the availability of funds.63 On oc-
casion, individual governments receive financial support from private
foundations, such as Uruguay in its case of Philip Morris v. Uruguay.64 The
the disputes brought to ICSID, 36 percent of the cases were disputes that were settled or proceed-
ing were otherwise discontinued. See The ICSID Caseload — Statistics, supra note 6.
59. See Investment Policy and Promotion: Product Offering, WORLD BANK GRP., http://
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/952171510251453291/IPP-Tools-booklet.pdf (last visited Apr. 22,
2021).
60. See Practice Notes for Respondents in ICSID Arbitration, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT
OF INV. DISPS. (2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/Practice
%20Notes%20for%20Respondents%20-%20Final.pdf.
61. See Introduction to ICSID Courses, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS. https://
icsid-archive.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Introduction-to-ICSID-Courses.aspx (last visited Apr.
22, 2021).
62. See Financial Assistance Fund, PERMANENT CT. ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/struc
ture/faf (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
63. See Financial Assistance to Parties, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/financial-
assistance-to-parties (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
64. Bloomberg Philanthropies supported Uruguay in this case. See Sarah Boseley, Bloom-
berg and Gates Launch Legal Fund to Help Countries Fight Big Tobacco, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18,
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African Legal Support Facility may selectively help countries in Africa in
arbitration cases in which it has assisted them in negotiating the underlying
contracts.65 IDLO offers dispute-settlement support for LDCs, based on pro
bono and reduced fee services.66 It is however not clear to what extent ser-
vices offered on a pro bono basis can be relied on and are sustainable as an
approach, given the costs involved; however, some firms may provide such
services as a strategy to enter the market and build up their practice.67
In other words, no predictable services comparable to those available
in other areas related to the international investment law and policy regime
in general and sources of conflicts in particular are available to support
under-resourced respondent governments in international investment
disputes.
4. The Possible Scope of Activities of an ACIIL
A wide range of issues related to the international law and policy re-
gime requires attention, and under-resourced countries could benefit from
technical assistance in regard to most of them. Fortunately, there are various
support services available regarding most of them, even if these could be
strengthened. However, when it comes to the handling of investment dis-
putes at the international level, virtually no predictable support is available
to under-resourced governments that are respondents in international invest-
ment disputes.
This is particularly worrisome because—as discussed earlier—the
number of investment disputes is large, the potential for many more dis-
putes is substantial and the costs of international dispute-settlement pro-
ceedings (both in terms of financial costs and possible negative effects for
host countries) can be considerable; moreover, it is quite likely that high-
quality representation may increase the likelihood of success in interna-
tional dispute settlement.68 At the same time, most developing countries
and economies in transition do not have the human and financial resources
to defend themselves adequately in international dispute-settlement pro-
ceedings; this, in turn, bears on the very legitimacy of the international in-
vestment law and policy regime.
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/18/bloomberg-gates-foundation-fund-na
tions-legal-fight-big-tobacco-courts.
65. Information provided by Stephen R. Karangizi, Director and Chief Executive Officer,
ALSF.
66. For details, see Investment Support Services for Least Developed Countries, supra note
55.
67. In addition, since most investment-dispute cases do not involve a clear public interest (as,
e.g., in Philip Morris v. Uruguay), but rather are of a purely commercial nature, this reduces the
appeal of pro bono services.
68. For a discussion of the extent to which attorney experience affects arbitration outcomes,
see Susan D. Franck & Lindsey R. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
65 DUKE L.J. 461 (2015).
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In light of this situation, an independent Advisory Centre on Interna-
tional Investment Law would fill an important lacuna in the international
investment regime. It could have, as its core purpose and competency, to
assist under-resourced beneficiary governments in obtaining adequate legal
defense in international investment disputes. Such assistance could focus on
selection and appointment of arbitrators, preparation of statements and evi-
dence, development of legal arguments, and representation at hearings. In-
corporating government lawyers from respondent States in defense teams—
including in the form of mixed teams—would contribute to capacity build-
ing. Assistance could also include providing alternative dispute resolution
services and giving legal advice on procedural and substantive issues aris-
ing under international investment law. Moreover, since a number of dis-
putes are settled amicably after arbitrations have commenced and before
final awards are rendered, the Centre could play a useful role in promoting
such settlements.69
The scope of the Centre’s work could also encompass the initial as-
sessment and preparation of cases, given that proper preparation is crucial
for the actual dispute hearings. This could include analysis of risks associ-
ated with cases and advice to governments as to whether or not they should
seek to settle a case—or seek mediation—before formal proceedings begin.
Close cooperation with ICSID to prepare governments for possible cases
would be very desirable in this respect,70 considering that that organization
is already providing services in this area. This would also contribute to the
building of local capacity regarding ISDS issues.
In having this clear focus, an ACIIL would avoid duplicating the work
of other organizations—also an important consideration—and disputes
would become financially more feasible, as dispute settlement proceedings
alone can be very expensive. In fact, particular care needs to be taken not to
overload the mandate of a Centre, as otherwise financial considerations
might ultimately prevent the Centre’s establishment.
Beyond its core mandate, the Centre’s work could eventually be ex-
tended to provide technical assistance and capacity building in other areas
of the international investment regime, in particular as regards the creation
of conflict-management arrangements at the national level and the exchange
of experience and best practices. Such a phasing-in could take place in the
light of experience gained, be made dependent on need and the availability
of resources, and be subject to the avoidance of duplication.
69. See Ana Ubilava, Amicable Settlements in Investor-State Disputes: Empirical Analysis of
Patterns and Perceived Problems, 21 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 528 (2020).
70. This could be done, for example, through joint workshops in interested countries, in order
to familiarize governments with the range of issues surrounding investment disputes.
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C. Governance
Membership in an ACIIL could be open to all countries: developing
countries, economies in transition and developed countries. As with the
ACWL, an ACIIL could have a general assembly (consisting of representa-
tives of its members and beneficiaries) to oversee all aspects of the Centre’s
functioning, and a management board (consisting of a small number of rep-
resentatives chosen to reflect the organization’s membership) to decide mat-
ters related to the Centre’s operation. Such a structure would allow the
ACIIL to operate in an independent manner.
An Executive Director could manage the Centre’s day-to-day activi-
ties. The Executive Director would have to provide competent leadership,
supported by dedicated staff who are respected and trusted by beneficiary
respondents. This, in turn, would allow the staff to establish a strong rela-
tionship with respondents and to act as an honest broker, including by ad-
vising governments on when to seek to settle a dispute. In fact, such a
Centre might be in a better position than any other organization to acquire
the trust and deep cooperation of its clients.
Crucially—and this is central to the Centre’s credibility—the in-house
staff of lawyers would have to be experts in international investment law.
Staffing would have to recognize that international investment law is not a
unified body of law, making it a complex71 matter to resolve investment
disputes—although not necessarily a more complex matter than resolving
WTO disputes: WTO law includes many different agreements covering va-
rious topics (antidumping, subsidies, intellectual property, technical barri-
ers, etc.), while investment disputes (although involving a much higher
number of instruments) are largely about a handful of provisions.72 (The
ACWL had, as of July 2019, a professional staff of 12, with four additional
staff on its secondment program.73)
D. Financing
As discussed earlier, arbitration proceedings are costly. Hence, the es-
tablishment of an ACIIL would require the creation of a substantial trust
fund. It could be financed by countries that have a particular interest in a
functioning international investment regime and are in a position to provide
technical assistance funds, as well as one-time payments by governments
becoming members of the Centre.
71. One of the complexities concerns the possibility that the ACIIL, in representing States,
may have to take different positions on the same obligation, depending on the underlying
instrument.
72. However, ACIIL lawyers would require a different skill set than those working in the
ACWL because advocacy in WTO disputes is different from advocacy in ISDS, where extempora-
neous oral pleadings and witness examination are essential.
73. See Staff, ACWL, https://www.acwl.ch/staff (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
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The Centre could charge some of its members modest fees for its assis-
tance, if only to make sure that they are conscientious in using its services
and to signal serious commitment.74 Moreover, in cases in which tribunals
allocate (part of) the costs of arbitration and/or defense to claimants, these
funds should revert to the trust fund.75 Beyond that, the Centre would need
to elicit voluntary contributions, including from foundations. Finally, it may
also be worthwhile to consider a longer-term approach in the framework of
which IIAs could stipulate that investors with claims above a certain size
need to pay a small percentage of their claims into the ACIIL’s trust fund,
contributing in this manner to the financing needs of the Centre.76 While
such an approach raises all sorts of questions and hence would need to be
further thought through,77 it could also contribute to more conservative
claims78 and furthermore discourage frivolous claims.
Underlying the important question of how to finance a Centre is the
consideration that a well-functioning and broadly accepted international in-
vestment regime is in the interest of States and investors.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND THE WAY FORWARD
There is undeniably a substantial need for assistance for under-
resourced States on a range of issues related to the international investment
law and policy regime. Nowhere is that need greater than in relation to its
dispute settlement mechanism, the heart of the investment regime.
The centrality and potency of the regime’s dispute settlement mecha-
nism makes it important that all States have de facto access to it on the basis
of equality of arms to defend themselves in the best possible manner. This
is all the more important in light of the rise of international investment
disputes (and the substantial potential for considerably more disputes) and
the costs of these disputes. Yet, many developing countries simply do not
have the experienced personnel and financial resources to defend them-
selves adequately in international investment disputes. It is a regime flaw
that undermines the credibility—and hence legitimacy—of the investment
regime.
74. There is also the question of avoiding that a few governments with many disputes de
facto monopolize the Centre on account of a relatively high number of arbitrations they face. One
approach to dealing with this issue is to consider a progressive scale of fees.
75. This would require setting up an internal system for ACIIL lawyers to account for their
time spent on a particular case.
76. An idea advanced by Patrick Pearsall.
77. For example: Would such an approach lead to investors claiming that the damages suf-
fered were actually higher on account of such a provision? Would tribunals compensate for this in
determining awards? Should (part of) such a payment be reimbursed if investors prevail?
78. See Nottage & Ubilava, supra note 19 (showing statistics which suggest that claims may
be overstated).
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The proposal for an Advisory Centre on International Investment Law
that is now on the agenda of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III is meant to
rectify this deficiency.
There are many issues that need to be decided in establishing an
ACIIL,79 especially its beneficiaries, the scope of its services, its govern-
ance, and its financing. Given that establishing such a Centre is costly (in
light of the costs of international dispute settlement) and considering the
work undertaken by other organizations, it would be advisable to focus the
Centre’s work on assisting under-resourced governments in the legal de-
fense in international investment disputes.
Hence, and more specifically, the core mandate of an ACIIL—its cen-
tral objective and competence—could consist of providing under-resourced
governments (through its own staff, in combination with representatives of
the respondent governments) with assistance in the selection of arbitrators,
the development of legal arguments, the preparation of statements and evi-
dence, and the representation at hearings. It could also include providing
alternative dispute resolution services and giving legal advice on issues
arising under international investment law. The focus of its mandate could
furthermore include the initial assessment and preparation of cases, given
that proper preparations are crucial for the actual hearing of cases.
Such an Advisory Centre would complement the assistance provided
by various governmental and non-governmental organizations in other mat-
ters related to the investment regime, especially regarding conflict avoid-
ance (including the negotiation of IIAs) and conflict management at the
national level. Over time, with experience gained, depending on need and
the availability of resources, and subject to the avoidance of duplication, the
Centre’s services could eventually be extended to other areas of assistance.
In determining the services provided by an ACIIL, care needs to be
taken that the scope of its work does not become too broad: overloading the
Centre’s mandate at the outset could risk raising the financial resources that
are required to bring it into existence, jeopardizing the entire project.
By providing administrative and legal assistance to under-resourced
respondents, an ACIIL would establish a level playing field in international
investment disputes. It would provide de facto access to justice and equality
of arms. In this manner, the ACIIL would fill a significant lacuna in the
international investment regime, a lacuna that is of great importance for
many developing countries and economies in transition and, more funda-
mentally, for the credibility and hence legitimacy of the regime itself. Ef-
forts leading to its establishment should be initiated as soon as possible, in
parallel to other efforts to improve the international investment law and
policy regime.
79. For an exhaustive discussion of the issues involved, see Johnson & Güven, supra note
41.
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It is therefore timely for the UNCITRAL Working Group III to con-
sider the desirability of an Advisory Centre on International Investment
Law, in light of the questions raised in this paper. Perhaps an informal inter-
sessional meeting hosted by interested governments could then develop—
on the basis of broad elements laid out by the Working Group—a consid-
ered understanding of the key issues involved in relation to the establish-
ment of an ACIIL, for consideration during a subsequent session of the
Working Group. Beyond that, interested governments may also want to
consult on the idea of an ACIIL at the margins of other meetings, especially
in a regional context. Finally, and as a preparatory step, the UNCITRAL
Secretariat—or the ISDS Academic Forum—could perhaps organize a
webinar for interested government representatives to outline the idea of an
Advisory Centre on International Investment Law and, in this manner, con-
tribute to reaching an informed understanding of the idea.
